ABSTRACT
Introduction
The issue of the impact of institutions on wages, including unions and collective bargaining, has long been of interest in Germany as in other nations. Historically, that interest has focused on the covariation of institutions and macroeconomic outcomes; specifically, the relation between bargaining structure and wage inflation and unemployment, often addressed in a comparative context (see, respectively, Fitzenberger and Franz, 1999; Nickel et al., 2005) . Altogether less interest has been accorded the effects of collective bargaining on individual wages or on wage dispersion. This differential research emphasis in part reflects data availability -namely, the absence until comparatively recently of good employer-employee linked data, especially those with a longitudinal capacity -and partly the distinctive nature of collective bargaining in Germany.
Arguably, the latter reason was more potent. Collective bargaining in Germany differs markedly from the Anglo-Saxon model. Sectoral or industry-level collective agreements between the relevant union and employers' association (Flächentarifverträge) have until recently been the uncontested norm. Under such (relatively centralized) agreements, collectively bargained wages and conditions are typically generalized to non-union members in covered firms, as constitutional considerations rule out discrimination between union members and non-members. In these circumstances, we may speak of a coverage effect resulting from membership of an employer's association that is party to the collective bargaining contract at industry/regional level.
1 Another distinctive facet of the German industrial relations architecture is that collective agreements can also be declared generally binding (i. establishments (employment) rose from 50.1 (35.9) percent to 61.9 (44.2) percent (Addison et al., 2012a) . 3 This erosion has in turn served to redirect attention towards an examination of union wage effects. By the same token, there has also occurred a continuing decline in extension agreements from around 2.9 percent of all primary agreements in 2000 to 1.5 percent in 2008. And while there has been some increase in orientation with the growth of the bargaining-free sector, there is no suggestion either in terms of frequency or remuneration that the degree of 'compensation' is other than partial (Addison et al., 2012b) . Both tendencies have further stimulated research interest in estimating contract differentials.
German workers can also be covered by firm-level agreements that are typically negotiated by the relevant industry union and the individual employer. Such agreements do of course more readily conform to the Anglo-Saxon pattern, and they expanded significantly in the 1990s (Hassel, 1999) . Since then, however, their growth has faltered and today -again in weighted terms -such agreements are found in just 2.7 percent of establishments, accounting for some 7.7 percent of employment (Addison et al., 2012a) . In the present treatment, and very pragmatically, we will aggregate over both types of collective agreement, sectoral and firmlevel. But note that firm-level contracts may be expected to yield a coverage premium of a roughly similar order of magnitude, not least because they may involve the mutually-agreed application of existing union contracts at industry level. In similar vein, the increasingly decentralized nature of sectoral bargaining in recent years, associated with formally recognized (as well as illegal) deviations from the ruling industry-level agreement (see, inter al., Bispinck, 2004; Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005) , might suggest that the distinction between sectoral and firm-level bargaining has become increasingly blurred. Both arguments inform our pragmatic treatment of collective bargaining as a composite.
4
Our longitudinal (unbalanced) firm-level data is extracted from the IAB establishment panel (IAB-Betriebspanel) . We emphasize that the use of these data for the present exercise is novel. After all, there are other German data sets offering matched employer-employee information. The sister IAB linked employer-employee data set, or LIAB, for example combines data from the IAB and the Employment Register, while the German Structure of Earnings (GSES or Gehalts-und Lohnstrukturerhebung) survey not only contains information on firm-level bargaining coverage but also on that of each individual worker (though not on union membership, which has to be estimated from other data sets such as the German SocioEconomic Panel (GSOEP or Sozio-ökonomisches Panel) . But neither data set is without blemish.
In the case of the LIAB (and IABS which is a 2 percent sample of social security records), for example, the wage data are right censored at the highest level of earnings that are subject to social security contributions. The result is that studies often omit censored wage data -rather than seeking to impute them using a Tobit regression -thereby losing roughly one-eighth of the observations (e.g. Gartner et al., 2010) . On the other hand, there are insufficient cases of individual worker mobility among sample establishments in the LIAB to permit the separate identification of unobserved individual and establishment-specific effects. For its part, the GSES has the advantages that hours of work are reported while earnings are not subject to truncation. That said, the GSES is a cross sectional data set and has no longitudinal capacity permitting the researcher to control directly for unobserved individual heterogeneity and thereby facilitating the identification of causal relationships.
The main goal of this study is to obtain indicative and updated estimates of the coverage premium that control for firm fixed effects and selection. The exercise is carried out using techniques that include matching models and separate samples of collective bargaining leavers and joiners and their corresponding counterfactual groups, against the backdrop of considerable flux in German labor institutions. In the process, despite the number of treatments, we obtain estimates of the adjusted union wage gap that fall within a narrow range. Moreover, such deviations as we observe for a mass layoff subsample of the data appear reasonable. 
Background Literature

German Studies
Modern studies of the collective bargaining premium in Germany have used the administrative data sets noted above, namely the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES) or the linkedemployer-employer data set of the Institute for Employment Research (LIAB) sometimes augmented by the IAB Employment Samples (IABS). 4 Of the two main data sets, analyses of the GSES have been the more common.
A useful starting point is the multi-level analysis of Stephan and Gerlach (2005) In addition to measuring coverage effects at firm level, the penultimate GSES study reviewed here also allows for individual coverage and union density, the latter being imputed from the German Socio-Economic Panel. 7 Using data from the 2001 GSES, Fitzenberger et al.'s (2008) OLS results indicate that firms that follow a collective agreement pay higher wages on average; specifically, the greater the share of workers in a firm covered by a collective contract, the higher are wages on average. The effects are somewhat larger for firm-level than sectoral agreements. But individuals subject to a collective agreement earn less cet. par. And the interaction effect with firm coverage is negative, so that on average a covered worker earns less than his/her uncovered counterpart in the same firm. That said, the effect of increasing firm coverage is positive for both types of individuals, it is just more positive for uncovered individuals who tend to be the more successful workers in the firm and tend not to be unionized. For its part, although union density (in the bargaining region) serves independently to lower wages, increases in density reduce or actually negate the negative effect of being a covered individual in a covered firm while reinforcing the positive effects of coverage at firm level. Finally, the individual bargaining coverage result has implications for the wage distribution, and one that receives support from the authors' separate quantile regression analysis; that is to say, the negative effect of individual coverage is stronger at higher quantiles of the conditional distribution (see also Burda et al., 2009) .
Of the GSES studies, only Antonczyk (2010) attempts to estimate the causal effect of (sectoral) collective bargaining on the wage structure for 2001, making use of two instrumental variables measured at district level -specifically, religious affiliation and union density.
Antonczyk reports the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) for the level of wages, where the former is the expected gain from coverage of a randomly assigned individual with a given set of observable characteristics, and the latter is the idiosyncratic gain for the individual receiving the treatment. (He also investigates the effect of collective bargaining on wage inequality using pairwise matching.) Antonczyk's initial OLS regression of log wages on a dummy variable indicating whether an employee works in an establishment applying a collective agreement, suggests that wages for the treated are on average 7.3 log points higher than for the untreated. After controlling for the higher tenure of 7 covered employees and the larger size of their employment unit, inter al., the coverage premium shrinks to 3.6 log points, pointing to positive selection into treatment based on observables. In turn, the ATE estimate or union wage effect is just 0.8 log points, while the ATET estimate is 1.6 log points. It is therefore concluded that individuals undergoing treatment have higher unobserved productivity and that they also profit from treatment (i.e. the idiosyncratic gains implied by the positive gap between the ATET and the ATE). Finally, Antonczyk reports that the small measured union effect on the wage level is consistent with a material effect on wage compression.
Studies using the LIAB are altogether less numerous and have been less concerned with distribution, with the principal exception of the influential contribution by Dustmann et al.
(2009) that investigates various explanations for the growth in German wage inequality in the 1990s. 8 The most relevant LIAB study is by Gürtzgen (2007 Gürtzgen ( ), using 1995 Gürtzgen ( -2002 In sum, the extant literature presents an interesting series of snapshots as to the impact of collective bargaining on wages (and the wage structure) as of circa 2000. 10 There is every indication of a positive union coverage differential at this time, albeit likely well short of some of the initial GSES estimates. But the issue of the scale of the union premium is necessarily clouded both by profound changes in German industrial relations, namely the continuing decline in unionism and collective bargaining coverage since 2000, and by issues of causality.
But before presenting our own updated estimates it is useful to contrast the German literature with U.S. findings. This will serve to underscore that the unsettled nature of estimates of the union wage gap is not confined to Germany, while also providing updated estimates based on plant-wide averages, albeit based on quasi-experimental methods.
U.S. Studies
Until very recently U.S. research has largely focused on estimating the effect of unionism using individual data. Such research has typically considered the effects of membership on wages. 11 A broad consensus -at least until most recently (see below) -has been an estimate of the union premium of around 15 percent, much higher than German estimates reviewed earlier.
Cross section estimates of the union gap have treated union membership status as either endogenous or exogenous. Studies using the former approach have attracted considerable controversy; initially because of the tremendous variation in estimates of the wage premium (e.g. Lewis, 1986; Hirsch and Addison, 1987: 123-127) , and subsequently because of the difficulty of identifying the selection model/appropriate instruments for union status (Hirsch, 2004: 237-238) . Such models are discussed in detail by Hirsch (2004: 238-241) .
Much of the research reflects U.S. data preoccupations associated with match bias in the 9 imputation of earnings in the principal data set available to researchers -the Current Population Survey (CPS) -and reporting error resulting from the misclassification of union status. Hirsch's research in particular indicates that these two biases serve to materially lower estimates of the union premium (e.g. Hirsch and Schumacher, 2004) . 12 They furthermore dominate any tendency toward diminution of the union wage premium through time. In short, there is little indication from such studies of any substantive narrowing in a union markup of around 15 percent on average (see also Blanchflower and Bryson, 2004) .
Longitudinal analysis of the union premium is concerned with the correlation between unmeasured skill and union status which, if positive, will yield upwardly biased estimates of the union premium. 13 The U.S. debate has centered on whether unionized workers are likely to be systematically more or less skilled than nonunion labor. Here, there are two opposing influences. On the one hand, in being able to select from a queue for union jobs firms can avoid hiring workers in the lower tail of the distribution. On the other, workers from the opposite tail are unlikely to be in the queue because of wage compression. 14 Studies identifying a union wage effect from the wage change of individuals that switch union status -thereby controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity, assuming that changes in status are exogenous -yield lower estimates of the union premium than those based on wage levels. But misclassification bias is a long-recognized issue here because although misclassification rates are small, so too is the incidence of switching. After correction for misclassification, a number of studies conclude that longitudinal estimates do not indicate that omitted ability bias has more than a rather modest impact on estimates of the union age gap (see, for example, Freeman, 1984; Card, 1996) . 15 More recent analyses of representation elections in the United States perhaps bear closer correspondence with the German literature. The starting point is DiNardo and Lee's (2004) comparison of establishments where unions became recognized by a close margin of the vote with those in which they barely lost, over the interval 1984-1999, employing a regression discontinuity methodology (see also Frandsen, 2012) . That is, they estimated a discontinuity in the relationship between wages and the vote share at the 50 percent vote threshold, where evidence of a discontinuous relation between the vote share and wages is deemed to be the causal impact of unionization by eliminating any confounding selection and omitted variable biases. DiNardo and Lee reported small and mostly negative union wage effects -the largest positive wage effect within two standard errors of the point estimate being just 0.014. They also attempted to compute any union threat effect on wages using an event-study approach for those elections where unions lost and failed to gain recognition. Wages were relatively stable in the pre-election period and for up to 11 years after the election (where a 3 percent increase by year 3 could be ruled out). DiNardo and Lee explained their results as reflecting the (omitted) role of unobserved firm heterogeneity in studies using individual data. 16 The study of Lee and Mas (2012) follows the much longer event-study tradition (e.g. Ruback and Zimmermann, 1984) and examines the effect of new unionization on publiclytraded firm's equity value, 1961-1999. The authors use a long panel -of up to 4 years before and after the representation election -of high frequency data on stock market returns for each firm in the sample. The event-study analysis revealed substantial losses in market value following a union election of $40,500 per unionized worker, which value is equated with a union premium of around 10 percent. The cumulative average returns of firms are found to be close to the benchmark portfolios matched on a firm's characteristics up to an election at which point the actual and the benchmark returns diverge. In addition to addressing the issue of how equity values respond to certification elections, the authors also estimate event-study models for elections with varying degrees of union support. There is a negative association between abnormal returns and vote share. Although there is no discernible discontinuity at the 50 percent union vote threshold, a greater than 60 percent share for example is associated with negative cumulative average returns in the range 20 to 30 percent. A formal regression discontinuity estimate of a union victory is statistically indistinguishable from zero, allowing these findings to be reconciled with DiNardo-Lee result without of course vindicating the regression discontinuity methodology. 17
In sum, the U.S. research has been preoccupied with many of the same theoretical concerns as the German literature, even if the empirical studies reflect distinctive industrial relations structures. And many of the research findings are no less settled. As a final example, one might take the case of earnings inequality, briefly touched upon earlier and rather less commonly examined in the United States. Although on this occasion, the directional influence is the same -namely, an inverse correlation between unions and inequality (e.g. Card, Lemieux, and Riddell, 2004 ) -U.S. observers evince greater skepticism as to causality than their German counterparts (e.g. Hirsch, 2004: 256) . Accordingly, there is disputation here as to what might happen to inequality among union workers were their unions to disappear -further complicating the computation of nonunion wages in the absence of unions.
The Dataset and the Raw Collective Bargaining Differential
We begin by briefly introducing the IAB Establishment Panel or Betriebspanel, a full description of which can be found in Fischer et al. (2009) . This dataset is based on a stratified random sample of the population of all establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance. Currently, the stratification has a basis in 19 industries and 10 employee size classes.
As employees, the non-for-profit sector, and agriculture. Establishments recording more than one change in collective bargaining status were also excluded from our sample (see section 5 below), as were those plants whose collective bargaining status was unreported.
Our firm-level wage variable is defined as the wage bill per full-time employee. This variable was obtained from three pieces of information extracted from the raw survey: first, the total wage bill, that is, the gross wages paid to workers, excluding social security contributions and holiday allowances; second, the total number of employees, excluding apprentices, temporary agency workers, and certain other residual categories; and, third, the number of part-time workers, all such information pertaining to end-June of the corresponding year. So as obtain the number of full-time equivalents, we assume two part-time workers are equivalent to one full-time worker. 18 As was noted earlier, one crucial advantage of the wage information contained in the nationally representative Betriebspanel is that it exactly reports the sum of all wages paid, without any right-or left-censoring. Nominal wages were deflated using the consumer price index throughout.
Given that the Establishment Panel was designed to facilitate labor market policy, its information on establishment characteristics is fairly detailed. We focus on a subset of these characteristics, including the shares of skilled, part-time, female, and fixed-term contract workers, and whether or not the establishment uses up-to-date technology, is owned by foreigners, is individually-owned, was founded before 1990, and engages in exporting. We also identify whether an establishment is a part of a multi-establishment entity and if it has a works council present. A variable capturing future sales -whether these are expected to be stable, increasing, or decreasing -is also deployed. In addition to these arguments, a full set of industry, sector, region, and establishment-size dummy variables complete the list of regressors, summary statistics on which are provided in Appendix Table 1. ( Tables 1 and 2 near here) Descriptive information on wages by collective agreement type is summarized in Table   1 . (The corresponding unweighted information on collective bargaining coverage is provided in Appendix Table 3 .) While interesting, this additional information on the implicit wage premium is very preliminary since we are not controlling for anything other than the change in collective bargaining status. We should also point out that examining real wage changes over two-year intervals -2000-2002, 2002-2004, etc. -did not present any obvious improvement in the sense that joiners more consistently gained and losers more consistently lost. Indeed, the evidence was quite to the contrary. Our argument thus remains the same: a sufficiently-specified control function is required to address the issue, although we shall present a separate sub-analysis based on those establishments that experienced mass layoffs in a further control for firm heterogeneity.
With these preliminaries behind us we therefore turn to the formal modeling exercise.
Econometric Modeling of the Collective Bargaining Effect on Firm Wages
Regression Analysis (Difference-in-Differences)
Investigation of the effects of collective bargaining status on establishment wages involves speculation as to how (average) wages would have developed in the absence of the institution.
Analysis of the problem therefore requires use of the standard Roy-Rubin model of potential outcomes (Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974) .
As a general framework, let us denote collective bargaining status by a binary variable ܷ ௧ and assume that in a given year t establishment i is either covered by a collective agreement in which case we observe the corresponding average wage ‫ݕ‬ ଵ௧ , or it is not covered and we observe ‫ݕ‬ ௧ . Further assuming that the outcome ‫ݕ‬ ௧ is a (linear) function of a time-invariant unobserved individual effect ߙ , time-specific unobserved factors ߛ ௧ , and observed establishment characteristics ܺ ௧ , where ܺ is a vector row and ߚ a vector column, we have
Under the assumptions that the expected outcome is independent of ܷ ௧ , conditional on
and that the causal effect of participation is additive and constant,
we can specify the general (unobserved effects) model as
where ‫ܧ‬ሺߝ ௧ | ߙ , ܺ ௧ , ܷ ௧ ሻ = 0.
Given that for collective agreement joiners (never members) ∆ܷ ௧ = 1 ሺ∆ܷ ௧ = 0), model (4) gives
In particular, for t = 1, 2, and for the set of joiners and never members, model (4) becomes
where ݀2 ௧ is a 1/0 dummy denoting t=2 , while ܷ ௧ = 0 for t=1, 2 if establishment i is a never member and ܷ ଵ = 0 and ܷ ଶ = 1 if i is a joiner.
Taking then the first difference of (5), we have
which is equivalent to
We have therefore the usual and important result that, at t=2, regressing ‫ݕ∆‬ ௧ on a constant, ∆ܺ ௧ , and ∆ܷ ௧ one obtains the treatment effect, ߜ መ . Moreover, ignoring the ∆ܺ ଶ term, from model (6), we obtain the difference-in-differences (DD) estimate ߜ መ , as follows
In short, an estimate of ߜ can ultimately be obtained by the difference in the average wage change between the two groups (of joiners and never members). 20 Mutatis mutandis for leavers versus always members. All that is required here is maintenance of the adequate DD assumption, or
This is equivalent to assuming the presence of a time-invariant individual effect in model (4).
In our empirical analysis of the 2000-2008 period, we will estimate model (6) using information on two consecutive years firstly in separate regressions and, secondly, in a pooled manner. The latter implementation simply regresses ‫ݕ∆‬ ௧ on a constant, ∆ܺ ௧ , and ∆ܷ ௧ , where t = 2, 3, …,9, while ignoring any individual (establishment) history. The pooled version of the conditional difference-in-differences approach next described follows a similar strategy.
Conditional Difference-in-Differences (Matching)
Up to this point, we have obtained the effect of collective bargaining status on average wages after having simply entered the vector of covariates ܺ into the unobserved effects model (4), the expectation being that the addition of a sufficiently large number of control variables will effectively purge the analysis of any correlation between unobservables and outcomes. 21 In the next step, however, rather than relying exclusively on a parametric model and a linear function form we will instead construct a matching control group, and then compute the difference in the average outcome across participants and non-participants to estimate the effect of participation (namely either separate act of joining or leaving).
The key point of the matching approach is to find, say, two units i and i' with the same probability of participation conditional on ܺ -or the same propensity score ‫‬ሺܺሻ -such that one unit receives treatment and the other does not. The goal is therefore to randomize participation ex-post by selecting two groups of establishments -such as joiners and never members -with, presumably, an identical probability of joining collective agreements but which by mere accident are not all treated in the treatment period. Simplifying the notation, we can write
Accordingly, if ܺ is a discrete variable, we have 
Clearly, ‫ܶܶܣ‬ ௦ in equation (8) resembles the average treatment effect on the treated ‫ܶܶܣ(‬ ) in (7). Having obtained a probit or logit estimate of ‫‬ሺܺ ሻ, one either stratifies ‫‬ሺܺ ሻ and works with a certain number of groups of treated and untreated units or one attempts to find for every single treated unit the corresponding propensity score matched unit, or units. If for some participant we have ‫̂‬ = 1, then the impact of treatment will have to be redefined to comprise only the estimated impact of the treatment on the treated for those whose propensity scores lie within the common support region, 0 < ‫‬ሺܺ ሻ < 1, discarding all those participants with ‫‬ሺܺሻ = 1. But even for a participant with a score in the support region it will not be always possible to find a perfect non-participant with exactly the same propensity score.
The 'distance' between the propensity score of, say, participant i and the propensity score of the matched non-participant j can be then used as a weighting factor in the differenced outcome (see below).
In this general framework, it can be shown (see Smith and Todd, 2005 ) that a typical (cross-section) matching estimator is given by
where ‫ܧ‬ ሺ‫ݕ‬ |ܷ = 1, ‫‬ሺܺ ሻ = ∑ ܹሺ݅, ݆ሻ‫ݕ‬ ∈ூ బ , ‫ܫ‬ ଵ is the set of participants, ݊ ଵ is the number of persons in the set ‫ܫ‬ ଵ ∩ ܵ , ܵ being the support region, ‫ܫ‬ is the set of non-participants, and ܹሺ݅, ݆ሻ gives the corresponding weights that will depend on the distance between ‫‬ሺܺ ሻ and ‫‬ሺܺ ሻ.
However, it is probably more realistic to abandon the underlying (cross-section) identification assumption, that, after conditioning on ܺ, the conditional mean independence is satisfied, and instead assume that a comparison between treated and matched untreated groups in a single year is not sufficient to capture all unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, under the hypothesis that not all systematic differences between participants ‫ܦ(‬ = 1) and nonparticipants ‫ܦ(‬ = 0)are captured by ܺ, and assuming that (unobserved) characteristics are time-invariant, by differencing the outcomes over time one will be able to obtain an improved estimate of the treatment effect. Specifically, we obtain the difference in differences matching estimator for longitudinal data, namely
This is an immediate extension of ߜ መ ்் ௦ in equation (9) above that holds under the appropriate DD identification hypothesis
As a first step in our matching approach, therefore, we will estimate a probit model in order to obtain the predicted probability of being treated, ‫‬ሺܺሻ, where X comprises an extended set of covariates. Once the predicted probability is obtained, we then apply different matching algorithms: nearest neighbor matching with replacement, radius matching, and kernel matching. Nearest neighbor matching with replacement consists of choosing for a control the In practice, 0.05 is often taken as the critical value, so that a successful matching will always imply SB<0.05. The t-test is a standard test on the null that the mean of each included covariate is the same across the two groups. In turn, our preferred route to estimate the variance of average treatment effects will be to use the method of bootstrapping, which amounts to reestimating the results R times and therefore to R bootstrap samples and R estimated average treatment effects. The distribution of these means approximates the sampling distribution of the population mean, which allows us then to compute the bootstrapped standard errors of the treatment effect.
Results
We focus on the private, for-profit sector and on establishments with at least five employees.
The employment size cut-off is imposed to control for the presence of works councils -five employees being required to trigger the formation of a works council -and to avoid excessive volatility with respect to collective bargaining coverage associated with very small establishments. 23 Further, since collective bargaining status is not always reported in the IAB survey (this is true for 10 percent of the cases in a given year), we consider only those units for which this status is always provided in two consecutive years. As a result, we lose some 20 percent of all establishments. In short, we opted not to impute collective bargaining status in these missing cases. Finally, multiple switchers -otherwise includable units with more than one change in status over the sample period -were also dropped from the sample. This excision was applied because we suspect that most such cases are the result of faulty coding.
(Nevertheless, results based on the sample of all units including those with imputed collective bargaining status and those with multiple collective bargaining transitions are available from the authors upon request. We found no material changes in the results as a result of their incorporation.) ( Tables 3 and 4 near here) Two main findings stand out. First, switching in or out of collective bargaining implies on average a change in wages of 3 to 3.5 percent, positive for joiners and negative for leavers (see the last columns of Tables 3 and 4) . Second, with a few exceptions, the evidence based on separate samples scarcely provides any statistically significant effect of collective agreement transitions on establishment wages. This latter result turns out to be quite relevant and likely indicates why analysts have been unable to obtain at establishment level a robust collective bargaining premium using single-year transitions. Indeed, random selection of any one cell from the first eight columns of Table 3 or Table 4 yields either implausible estimates of the premium 20 derived from joining/leaving a collective agreement of any type or, more likely, statistically insignificant estimates. In short, the strategy of enlarging the sample as much as possible by including all joiners and leavers (and corresponding control groups) in a single, pooled sample is crucial.
Difference-in-Differences: Findings
Our use of a relatively large set of regressors makes it more likely that a proper control function has been used in the difference-in-differences (OLS) regression. But whether we are using proper control groups can only be addressed in a matching framework.
Conditional Difference-in-Differences (Matching): Findings
Tables 5 and 6 present alternative estimates of the effects of entering into or abandoning a collective agreement based on propensity score matching. Note that the nearest neighbor results are more or less the same as those discussed below, but since the quality of the match is always lower we focus on the two other variants of the model. Further note that the evidence for separate transition periods is now omitted. In the pooled cases presented here, observe that the treatment group is again made up of all joiners/leavers that happen to join/leave in any single year, [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . For its part, the group of (matched) untreated establishments is made up of all units that in any two consecutive years did not switch into (out of) collective bargaining. By way of a caveat, since an establishment j is a joiner (leaver) after being a never member (always member) for some time, if j is in the observation window for more than one year prior to the event of joining there is a possibility that the self-same establishment might be at once a joiner (leaver) and a member of the control group. Having identified such cases, we checked the sensitivity of our results to their exclusion. We can confirm that our findings were not materially affected, the results being available from the authors upon request.
( Table 5 near here) As is apparent, the conditional difference-in-differences estimates based on propensity score matching of the treated and untreated groups are strikingly close to the regression DD results. That is to say, the effect of joining/leaving is both symmetric and again in the 3 to 4 percent range for the pooled case. For the kernel matching case in Table 5 , we see that the collective bargaining premium obtained using the sample of joiners and never members lies 21 between 3.2 and 3.5 percent, very close to the DD estimates in Table 3 . In turn, the estimated collective bargaining wage premium using leavers and always members in the second row is now slightly higher than before, at 3.8 percent. All wage premia are statistically significant at either the .01 or .05 level.
( Table 6 near here)
In Table 6 we present results from using a different matching algorithm, namely radius matching. For each sample -joiners versus never members and leavers versus always members -the treatement effect is again strikingly in the 3 to 4 percent range. As a peripheral issue, note that the radius caliper methodology is out-performed by the kernel technique in respect of individual year transitions as virtually none of the treatment effects is statistically significant.
An observation on the quality of the matching between treated and untreated groups might usefully be added. Without exception, the mean standardized bias (the mba row in Tables 5 and 6 ) was substantially reduced after matching. This means that the difference in mean characteristics across treated and untreated groups has been reduced or, equivalently, that the groups have, after matching, approximately the same observed characteristics.
Specifically, after matching, the mba statistic is always smaller than 5 percent in the pooled case. 24 Finally, we also provide the pseudo-R 2 for the propensity score/probit model run after matching the treated and untreated groups. As in all cases the pseudo R 2 statistic tends to be very low, it follows that after matching on (observed) firm characteristics the treatment is fairly at random. The LR statistic in the last row of each panel also shows that after matching we cannot reject the null that the set of regressors in the propensity score probit is not jointly statistically significant. And although not reported in Tables 5 and 6 , the number of off-support units is always modest, never exceeding 5 percent of the total number of untreated units either in the case of joiners or leavers.
Robustness: Results for the Subsample of Mass Layoffs
We now examine the robustness of our results for a sub-sample of establishments in which the reduction in the workforce exceeded a certain threshold, deemed collective dismissals. The Note that we do not have information on intra-annual employment changes; rather, we can only observe employment changes at establishment level from year t to year t+1. But using exactly the same estimation sample as in Tables 3 and 4 , 7 percent of all collective bargaining leavers are flagged as mass layoffs. This compares with 11 percent among the group of always members. The corresponding estimates for joiners and never members are 6 percent and 4 percent, respectively. In short, mass layoffs are roughly the same in percentage terms among leavers and joiners, but they are much less common among never members than for always members. 25 Next, we re-ran model (6). The results are presented in Table 7 , but only for the pooled case given the limited number of annual mass layoffs yielded by our sample. Assuming that mass layoffs might provide a less contaminated sample -in the sense that endogenous worker separations are less of a problem -the results in Table 7 suggest that the wage effect of leaving a collective agreement is probably larger than the -3.5 percent effect found in Table 4 . Indeed, the estimated effect for the mass layoff sample is between -8.2 and -9.9 percent (see column (2) of table 7). For the subsample of joiners (and never members), shown in column (1) of table and among whom mass layoffs were less common, the results are necessarily weaker than those in column (2) and we do not find any statistically significant evidence of the presence of any collective bargaining wage effect in this case. Furthermore, this result for joiners is not unexpected as short-run effects are likely to dominate: if a given establishment is laying off a sizeable proportion of its workforce, wage gains are unlikely over a one year horizon.
( Table 7 near here)
We turn in conclusion to the results of the regression exercise once we net out the mass layoffs. The findings are provided in the bottom half of Table 7 (net sample). They show that 23 the evidence earlier reported in Tables 3 and 4 is insensitive to the exclusion of mass layoffs. In other words, whenever the employment changes are not too dramatic (specifically, below the collective dismissals threshold), we have the key result that the wage effect of collective bargaining coverage is symmetric and around 3.5 percent. In this context -and given the relatively small number of mass layoffs in the sample and the difficulty in identifying them in practice -we have no strong reason to seriously question the results in Tables 3 and 4 . The possible caveat is that whenever there is a sizeable reduction in the workforce, leaving a collective agreement is likely to imply a larger reduction in average wages than the benchmark loss of 3.5 percent indicated in Table 4 .
Conclusions
Notwithstanding the steadily increasing number of studies seeking to determine the earnings impact of unionism and collective bargaining in Germany, the magnitude of the union wage premium is unsettled -no less so than in the United States. Be it due to the lack appropriate wage data, the difficulty of constructing a proper control group, or assembling a sufficient time series, the range of estimates of the adjusted union contract differential surveyed in section 2.1 as of circa 2001s too wide for comfort.
The principal goal of the present inquiry has been to derive selection-adjusted estimates of the effect of collective bargaining on average wages at the level of the firm, and thereby to inform the debate on the scale of the wage premium. That is, we have sought to obtain solid indicative estimates extracted from a sufficiently representative sample of the economy based on a comparatively long and updated time frame.
It is fully recognized that the effect of collective bargaining on wages may be expected to differ across individuals and even by type of collective agreement. But there are enough reasons to sustain a broader focus at this stage. And that has been to provide a reasonable ballpark estimate of the wage gap of a covered establishment vis-à-vis its uncovered counterpart. To this end, we have aggregated pragmatically across two types of collective bargaining -sectoral and firm-level agreements -against the backdrop of the pronounced decline in collective bargaining as a whole. Clearly, these collective agreements differ much 3. No less important has been the decline in union density. Over the same interval, union density fell from 24.6 percent to 19.6 percent (Bispinck et al., 2010) .
4. For earlier studies using the German Socio-Economic panel (GSOEP) that focus on changes in the wage structure, see OECD, 1996; Steiner and Wagner, 1998 . It is widely acknowledged that the GSEOP measures wages with much less precision than in administrative data where misreporting is subject to severe penalties. Gerlach and Stephan (2006a; 2006b ) also point to lower wage dispersion under collective than individual bargaining. See also the regional study of Bechtel et al. (2004) .
Companion studies by
6. Heinbach and Spindler also assess the distributional effects of bargaining using quantile regression decomposition techniques. For both sample years it is reported for all three models that the bargaining effect is highest in the lower parts of groups' wage distributions and decreases with increasing wages, although by 2001 the bargaining effect is reported in all parts of the wage distribution. In common with all other GSES studies, Heinbach and Spindler's analysis suggests that bargaining reduces inequality.
7. For separate studies of the union density-wage nexus, see, inter al., Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005) ; Büttner and Fitzenberger (1998) .
8. Up to 28 percent of the increase in inequality in the lower end of the wage distribution at this time is attributed to union decline.
9. That said, Gürtzgen also provides an analysis of the wage consequences of transitioning between contract types based on trend-adjusted difference-in-difference estimators that might suggest that the former estimate is downwardly biased and the latter effect confounded by wage losses experienced by those joining sectoral agreements.
10. An exception is the very recent study by Antonczyk et al., (2010) that tracks wage inequality up to 2006.
11. There is almost no U.S. work on the effects of coverage on the wage gap, not only because of the relatively few covered nonunion members in the Unites States but also for data reasons including misclassification. What evidence there is, points to a much smaller coverage than membership premium (e.g. Schumacher, 1999; Budd and Na, 2000) , although the jury is still out on the causes (see Hirsch, 2004: 257-258) .
12. The scale of the problem is as follows, given an estimate of the union premium in 2001 of .13 log points using the full CPS sample comprising workers with and without imputed earnings. Correcting for match bias (by excluding those with imputed earnings) raises the wage premium to .18 log points, while correcting for misclassification bias (of just 2 percent) increases it to .24 log points.
13. In the event of a positive correlation between unmeasured skills and unionization, a movement from a nonunion (union) to a union (nonunion) job should entail a small wage gain (loss).
14. See also Wessels' (1994) argument that upgrading on the part of employers may not be expected on theoretical grounds.
15. Hirsch (2004: 254-255) further notes that longitudinal estimates that control for skill groups have broadly similar union gap estimates by skill. This is the result of two opposing forces: positive selection at the lowest skill levels and negative section at the highest levels. After sorting, so the argument runs, wage effects vary little by skill group.
16. They also allude to the lingering imprecision of the union treatment effect in longitudinal studies using household-level data where randomly chosen individuals are presumed as moving from a randomly chosen nonunion employer to a randomly chosen union employer.
17. Note that the regression discontinuity methodology is unable to provide a counterfactual for the set of elections where the large majority of workers vote in favor of unionization. The counterfactual in the event-study approach is what would have happened in the absence of any representation election.
18. Although there is no information in the Betriebspanel on hours worked at the individual (worker) level, the share of part-time workers by different categories of working hours is available. We experimented with various strategies for allocating part-timers and concluded that the rule 'two part-timers equal one full-timer' adequately represented these data.
19. There are transitions into and out of works councils as well. But these movements are much less frequent and we will here simply treat works council status as an additional control variable.
20. It follows from model (6) that ߛ ො ଶ = ‫ݕ∆‬ ே௩ തതതതതതതതതത (Wooldridge, 2002: 283-284) . These results show a more general result that ߜ መ can ultimately be obtained from a general unobserved 27 model (4), and that, for T=2 (that is, a panel with two years), first differences and difference-indifferences yield the same estimate of the treatment effect.
21. An alternative to a full set of control variables is the use of a more parsimonious equation in which the estimated propensity score term, ‫̂‬, with ‫‬ = ‫‬ሺܺ ሻ ≡ ‫ܷ‪ܾሺ‬ݎܲ‬ = 1|ܺ ሻ, is added to the linear regression of ‫ݕ∆‬ ௧ on a constant, ∆ܺ ௧ , and ∆ܷ ௧ . Indeed, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) advocate adding an additional term ܷ ሺ‫‬ − ߤ), where ߤ is the sample average of ‫‬. Unfortunately, it is not obvious which approach is more appropriate (Woodridge, 2002: 619-620) .
22. DD matching and pure regression DD estimates might not differ by much. For the crosssection case, this point can be illustrated in relatively straightforward manner by setting ‫ݕ‬ = ‫ݕ‬ + ܷ ሺ‫ݕ‬ ଵ − ‫ݕ‬ ሻ, with ‫ݕ‬ = ߤ + ‫ݒ‬ , ‫ݕ‬ ଵ = ߤ ଵ + ‫ݒ‬ ଵ , ߤ = ‫ݕ‪ሺ‬ܧ‬ ), and ߤ ଵ = ‫ݕ‪ሺ‬ܧ‬ ଵ ). Further assuming both ‫ݒ‪ሺ‬ܧ‬ |ܺ ) = ‫ݒ‪ሺ‬ܧ‬ ଵ |ܺ ) and the conditional mean independence assumption, we have ‫ݕ‪ሺ‬ܧ‬ |ܷ , ܺ ሻ = ߤ + ߙܷ + ݃ ሺܺ ሻ, with ߙ ≡ ‫ܶܶܣ‬ and ݃ ሺܺ ሻ = ‫ݒ‪ሺ‬ܧ‬ |ܺ ሻ, the control function. If regression analysis explicitly requires these two assumptions plus additivity, matching has its own associated difficulties. Specifically, since there will be as many treatment effects as ܺ ′ s, perfect matches are not in general possible so that an explicit weighting rule is required.
23. We experimented with several establishment size filters, the main issue being whether we should allow an establishment to fall below the minimum number of five employees at any time. After testing alternative rules, we implemented the restriction that establishments have the 5-employee minimum in at least one year in the sample period. (Results based on different filters are available from the authors upon request.)
24. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) , an mba of 20 percent is considered large, and one of less than 5 percent very good.
25. Especially for the group of small establishments there will be an overestimation of mass layoffs as the Establishment Panel does not allow us to distinguish between a voluntary quit and an employer-initiated separation. For larger firms, however, this is less of an issue because it is unlikely to be the case that, say, say, a 10 percent reduction in the workforce, is largely the result of voluntary quits. Notes: The reported figures are per full-time equivalent employee. The number of full-time equivalent workers is given by the sum of full-time workers plus 0.5 (part-time workers). Real wages, which reference the year 2000, were obtained using the inverse of the consumer price index as a deflator. See the text for full description of the dataset. Notes: The model specification is given by equation (6) in the text. In each column, N gives the number of establishments observed in the two corresponding (consecutive) years. The set of regressors includes all the variables described in Appendix Table 1 , plus year dummies in the pooled case. In panel (a) , the time-varying regressors are in first differences. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Note: See notes to Table 3 . ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Table 3 . mba indicates the mean standardized (absolute) bias in percentage, while the pseudo-R 2 and LR statistics are drawn from the propensity score regression (probit) run after matching the treated and untreated groups. The likelihood ratio (LR) tests the joint significance of all included variables in the probit regression. ***, ** denote statistical significance at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively. Notes: See notes to Table 3 . ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.
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